1	David Scotese
2	Murrieta, CA 92563
3	Fax Number: NA Email:
4	David Scotese, IN PRO PER
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7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8	FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9	EASTERN DIVISION
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11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) Case No.: CV 16-01166-DSF (KK)
12	CLAIMANT DAVID SCOTESE'S RENEWED STATEMENT OF GENUINE DISPUTES OF
13	Plaintiff, MATERIAL FACT IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION FOR
14	VS. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
15	\$15,000.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY,
16	Defendant)
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21	Pursuant to Local Rule 56-2 of the Local Rules for the Central
22	District of California, CLAIMANT sets forth the following genuine
23	disputes of material fact disputing assertions made in plaintiff's
24	[PROPOSED] STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
25	LAW (Dkt. 39).
26	Disputes regarding plaintiff's CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
27	Several of the assertions plaintiff makes in the CONCLUSIONS OF
28	LAW section are in dispute. To the extent that they can be
	-1-

CLAIMANT'S RENEWED STATEMENT OF GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT

regarded as material facts, they are in dispute as described 2 below. Conclusion of Law 11 of plaintiff's [PROPOSED] STATEMENT OF 3 4 UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (henceforth, 5 "STATEMENT"), referencing FinCEN guidance, includes this text: 6 "... and in exchange sends 'value that substitutes for currency' 7 (i.e., bitcoin) to the electronic ... "See STATEMENT, p. 7:25 - p. 8 8:3. To the extent that FinCEN considers the quoted text to 9 address bitcoin can be regarded as a material fact, is disputed (DISPUTE 1). 10 Conclusion of Law 12 of STATEMENT includes this text: 11 12 "All three elements of Section 5330(d)(1) are satisfied here, 13 Claimant was required under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 to register with FinCEN." See plaintiff's STATEMENT, p. 8:23-25. To the extent that 14 15 that all three elements are satisfied can be regarded as a material fact, it is disputed (DISPUTE 2). To the extent that 16 17 claimant was required to register with FinCEN can be regarded as a 18 material fact, is disputed (DISPUTE 3). 19 The definition of the term "unlicensed money transmitting 20 business" provides three requirements, ("Requirement (A)", 21 "Requirement (B)", and "Requirement (C)"), at least one of which must be met. See 18 U.S.C. 1960(b)(1). Plaintiff asserts that 22 23 claimant meets Requirement (B), "fails to comply with the money 24 transmitting business registration requirements under section 5330 25 of title 31, United States Code, or regulations prescribed under 26 such section." To the extent that this assertion can be regarded 27 as a material fact, it is disputed (DISPUTE 4).

Plaintiff asserts that the requirement at 31 C.F.R. 1010.311

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(which "requires the reporting of transactions in excess of \$10,000") applies to claimant. See plaintiff's STATEMENT, p. 8:9-11. To the extent that this assertion can be regarded as a material fact, it is disputed (DISPUTE 5).

Concise Reasons for Disputes

- 1. The quoted section of page 4 of Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, FIN-2013-G001, Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, March 18, 2013 ("GUIDANCE") is about Centralized Virtual Currencies and bitcoin is not a Centralized Virtual Currency. This is explained in detail below for the Court's convenience if there is interest, and so that the record will reflect it.
- 2. The second element of Section 5330(d)(1) of 31 U.S.C. 5330(d)(1)was not satisfied because the requirement to file reports under 31 U.S.C. 5313 does not apply to claimant, but to "Each financial institution other than a casino" (See 31 C.F.R. 1010.311), and whether or not claimant is a financial institution has not been established. Claimant denies being a financial institution, and a justification of that denial is provided below for the Court's convenience if there is interest, and so that the record will reflect it.
- 3. The reason for dispute 2 is the same as the reason for dispute 3, that only financial institutions are required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. 5313.
- 4. Claimant does not meet "Requirement B" because claimant is not a person "who owns or controls a money transmitting business", because he does not meet the second element of the definition of

"money transmitting business". An exploration of plaintiff's possible arguments against this dispute is provided below for the Court's convenience if there is interest, and so that the record will reflect it.

5. The requirement at 31 C.F.R. 1010.311 hinges on previously disputed assertion number 2.

Extended Analysis and Justifications for Disputes

Analysis regarding DISPUTE 1: GUIDANCE, on page four, has more than what plaintiff has written:

"... to another location, namely from the user's account at one location (e.g., a user's real currency account at a bank) to the user's convertible virtual currency account with the administrator." (First emphasis in original, second emphasis added). See GUIDANCE, p. 4.

The added emphasis here is important for three reasons. First, the word "the" suggests that there is only one administrator.

This is because plaintiff has quoted from a section of the guidance which is about *Centralized Virtual Currencies*. Bitcoin is not a centralized virtual currency. This shows that plaintiff's parenthetical "(i.e., bitcoin)" at STATEMENT, p. 8:1 is, at best, misleading.

Second, under the section of GUIDANCE that more appropriately applies to bitcoin, De-Centralized Virtual Currencies, the last paragraph explains two methods through which "[a] person that creates units of this convertible virtual currency" may or may not be a money transmitter, and lastly explains that "a person [who may not have created such units] is an exchanger and a money

transmitter if the person accepts such de-centralized convertible virtual currency from one person and transmits it to another person as part of the acceptance and transfer of currency, funds, 3 or other value that substitutes for currency." See GUIDANCE, p. 4 5 5. There is no evidence that claimant has created any units of There is no evidence that claimant has accepted bitcoin bitcoin. 6 7 "from one person and transmit[ted] it to another person as part of the acceptance and transfer." Emphasis has been added to match 8 9 the regulation on which GUIDANCE was based. See 31 C.F.R. 10 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) and footnote 11 of GUIDANCE, p. 3. 11 Third, FinCEN recognizes that when an administrator, even an 12 administrator of a de-centralized virtual currency, creates units, 13 that administrator is facilitating the transfer of the virtual

currency from one party to another, a fundamental property of

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virtual currencies:

A person that creates units of this convertible virtual currency and uses it to purchase real or virtual goods and services is a user of the convertible virtual currency and not subject to regulation as a money transmitter. By contrast, a person that creates units of convertible virtual currency and sells those units to another person for real currency or its equivalent is engaged in transmission to another location and is a money transmitter. (GUIDANCE, page 5, second paragraph of section c. De-Centralized Virtual Currencies)

These two situations contain more insight into the distinction that the regulation at 31 C.F.R. 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(F) makes between money transmission as the essence of a service, and money

1 transmission as "integral to the sale of goods". In the first situation, the creator of the units uses the currency he generates to purchase goods and services (a sale to himself), and in order 3 to make those purchases, the administrator must first create the 4 units of virtual currency, which requires the "money transmission" 5 that is fundamental to the creation of such units. In the second, 6 7 he is essentially being paid by whoever purchases the units he creates to transmit virtual currency on behalf of others. 8 9 Claimant necessarily relies on such administrators to perform 10 the "transmission" to which plaintiff refers: "Under Section 11 5330's implementing regulations the element of 'transmission' is 12 satisfied by a transfer to 'another location or person by any 13 means.' 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i) (emphasis added)." 14 STATEMENT, p. 7:22-25. 15 Analysis regarding DISPUTES 2-5: The law states "Whoever 16 knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business, 17 18 shall be fined in accordance with this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both." (emphasis added) See 18 U.S.C. 19 20 1960(a). The definition of the term "unlicensed money 21 transmitting business" provides three requirements, (herein called 22 "Requirement (A)", "Requirement (B)", and "Requirement (C)"), at 23 least one of which must be met. See 18 U.S.C. 1960(b)(1). 24 Plaintiff asserts that claimant meets Requirement (B). See 25 STATEMENT, p. 8:9-11. To the extent that this assertion can be 26 regarded as a material fact, it is disputed as follows: 27 Requirement (B) is that the business "fails to comply with the

money transmitting business registration requirements under

section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or regulations 2 prescribed under such section." Specifically, the "money transmitting business registration requirements" are at 31 U.S.C. 3 5330(a)(1) which says "Any person who owns or controls a money 4 5 transmitting business shall register the business," and 31 C.F.R. 1022.380, which says "each money services business (whether or not 6 7 licensed as a money services business by any State) must register 8 with FinCEN." (emphasis added) Clearly, only those who own or 9 control a "money transmitting business" and those who are money 10 services businesses can "fail to comply" with these registration 11 requirements. In order to suggest that claimant falls into at 12 least one of these categories, plaintiff claims to show that 13 claimant fits the definition at 31 U.S.C. 5330(d)(1) of "Money transmitting business". See STATEMENT, p. 8:23. To the extent that 14 15 this claim can be regarded as a material fact, it is disputed as 16 follows: Plaintiff admits that for claimant to fit the definition at 31 17 18 U.S.C. 5330(d)(1), claimant must be "required to file reports 19 under 31 U.S.C. § 5313." See STATEMENT, p. 6:14-15, 18. Plaintiff 20 asserts that the requirement at 31 C.F.R. 1010.311 (which "requires the reporting of transactions in excess of \$10,000") 21 22 applies to claimant. See plaintiff's STATEMENT, p. 8:9-11. To the 23 extent that this assertion can be regarded as a material fact, it 24 is disputed as follows: 25 Plaintiff fails to consider that the implementing regulation 26 places such a requirement only on "[e]ach financial institution 27 other than a casino," (See 31 C.F.R. 1010.311) and that claimant

is not a financial institution. Plaintiff may be counting on the

Court's inference that claimant is a financial institution, based on plaintiff's characterization of claimant as a "currency exchange," which is listed as one of the things that fits the 3 definition of "financial institution" at 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(J). 4 5 However, this would require that claimant be exchanging "currency", or "coin [or] paper money of the United States, U.S. 6 silver certificates, U.S. notes, Federal Reserve notes, or 7 official foreign bank notes" for "coin [or] paper money of the 8 9 United States, U.S. silver certificates, U.S. notes, Federal 10 Reserve notes, or official foreign bank notes". See 31 C.F.R. 11 1010.100(m). 12 This is an obvious dispute with plaintiff's assertion that 13 claimant owns or controls a "Money transmitting business" as defined at 31 U.S.C. 5330(d)(1). Thus, there is no evidence that 14 15 Requirement (B) is met. 16 Requirement (A) is that such business be "in a State where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony under State 17 18 law." There is no evidence that this requirement is met. 19 Requirement (C) is that the business "otherwise involves the 20 transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the 21 defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are 22 intended to be used to promote or support unlawful activity." 23 evidence has been offered that claimant transported or transmitted 24 any funds claimant knew to have been derived from a criminal 25 offense or intended to be used to promote or support unlawful 26 Thus, there is no evidence that Requirement (C) is met. activity. 27 Plaintiff may alternatively be counting on the Court's inference

C.F.R. 1010.100(ff)(5). This contention has been addressed in previous filings (Dkt. 25 and Dkt. 30), the relevant parts of which are repeated here for the convenience of the Court, slightly 3 edited to make it appropriate with this Statement of Genuine 4 5 Disputes: 6 GUIDANCE, on page 3, states: 7 An administrator or exchanger that (1) accepts and transmits 8 a convertible virtual currency or (2) buys or sells 9 convertible virtual currency for any reason is a money 10 transmitter under FinCEN's regulations, unless a limitation 11 to or exemption from the definition applies to the person. 12 (emphasis added) 13 The regulations on which this guidance is based explain further why the emphasis added is important at 31 C.F.R. 1010.100(ff)(5) 14 15 Money Transmitter -16 (i) In General. (A) A person that provides money transmission services. The term "money transmission services" means the 17 18 acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that 19 substitutes for currency from one person and the transmission 20 of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for 21 currency to another location or person by any means. Emphasis of the word "and" is in the original. 1 22 23 Filed with claimant's previous statement of genuine dispute, 24 both under the same docket number, is a sworn affidavit (Dkt. 25, 25 In its section on Decentralized Virtual Currencies (where Bitcoin 26

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^{&#}x27;In its section on *Decentralized Virtual Currencies* (where Bitcoin best fits), FinCEN's guidance also indicates that (if the person does not create the units of virtual currency) a person must both accept the virtual currency from one person **and** transmit it to another person as part of the acceptance and transfer in order to be a Money Transmitter. (See FIN-2013-G001)

PACER pp. 5-7) showing that CLAIMANT is not a Money Transmitter according to the relevant law because he has not created units of bitcoin, has not accepted bitcoins and transferred them to another person or location as part of the acceptance, has ensured that he sent bitcoin only to the person purchasing it from him, and has not sold anyone else's bitcoin (Dkt. 25, PACER p. 6:13-19).

Plaintiff may attempt to show that Claimant is a "money transmitter" according to 31 C.F.R. 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(B) ("Subsection (B)"), which identifies "Any other person engaged in the transfer of funds" as a "Money Transmitter." Plaintiff agrees that "the transfer of funds" is synonymous with "Funds Transfer" (See Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgement, Dkt. 29, at p. 2:19-20 and p. 3:1.), and acknowledges that a "Funds Transfer" is "[t]he series of transactions, beginning with the originator's payment order, made for the purpose of making payment to the beneficiary of the order" (31 C.F.R. 1010.100(w)). In a tacit admission that the explicit definition² of "Funds Transfer" does not apply to Claimant's activities, plaintiff may cite In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 355(2d Cir. 1992). The citation was previously used to allege that "a 'transfer' and an 'exchange' are synonymous," See Dkt. 29, p. 3:5-8. A careful reading of the cited paragraph shows that the McKinney court used the term

[&]quot;When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning." Stenberg v. Carhart 530 U.S. 914 (2000); "It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated meanings of that term." Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987); "Of course statutory definitions of terms used therein prevail over colloquial meanings. Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87.95, 55 S.Ct: 333, 336." Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S.490 (1945); "[W]e are not at liberty to put our gloss on the definition that Congress provided by looking to the generally accepted meaning of the defined term." Tenn. Prot. & Advocacy Inc. v. Wells, 371 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2004).

or something else ("each party is a seller of the goods which he is to transfer.", citing N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-304(1) (McKinney 1964)), rather than the origination of a "payment order" and the series of transactions between banks that effect payment to a beneficiary.

"transfer" to indicate the sending of goods, whether such goods be money

A "payment order" is "An instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally, electronically, or in writing, to pay, or to cause another bank or foreign bank to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary" under specific conditions (31 C.F.R. 1010.100(11)) (emphasis added). To be a "Funds Transfer," the first transaction must be a "payment order" and therefore involve a "receiving bank." Thus, in the context of the relevant statute, an exchange cannot be a "Funds Transfer" if it does not involve a "receiving bank." Any exchange that does not involve a receiving bank is therefore not an activity referenced in Subsection (B).

Plaintiff acknowledges that the defendant currency was sent by Ochle to Claimant without any "receiving bank" (Dkt. 29, p. 4:1-2), and that Claimant provided 32 bitcoins to Ochle in exchange for the defendant currency, also without any "receiving bank" (Dkt. 29, p.3:13-15.). Since the "receiving bank" element imputed to the part of the definition of "Money Transmitter" at Subsection (B) by the definition of "Funds Transfer" at 31 C.F.R.

1010.100(ll) was not present, Subsection (B) does not apply to claimant's trade with Ochle.

Analysis Against the Motion for Summary Judgement

The defects in plaintiff's CONCLUSIONS OF LAW can be viewed with

respect to guidance from FinCEN in 2014. In January of 2014, in response to and in reference to a company that requested guidance, FinCEN wrote "...to the extent that the Company limits its activities strictly to investing in virtual currency for its own account, it is not acting as a money transmitter and is not an MSB under FinCEN's regulations." (emphasis added) Because claimant has limited claimant's activities to investing in virtual currency for his own account, he has not been acting as a money transmitter and is not an MSB under FinCEN's regulations according to this guidance. This shows again that plaintiff's conclusions of law numbered 10, 11, and 12 are genuinely disputed.

The guidance from FinCEN also states that "In addition, should the Company begin to engage as a business in the exchange of virtual currency against currency of legal tender (or even against other convertible virtual currency), the Company would become a money transmitter under FinCEN's regulations." Because the activities comprising engagement "as a business in the exchange of virtual currency against currency of legal tender" can be easily confused with "investing in virtual currency for [one's] own account," as plaintiff has apparently done, the distinction is very important.

FinCEN explains, "To the extent that the Company purchases and sells convertible virtual currency, paying and receiving the equivalent value in currency of legal tender to and from counterparties, all exclusively as investments for its own

³see https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2014-R002.pdf, page 4, lines 7-10 of paragraph 1

4 Tbid., page 4, lines 5-8 of paragraph 2

account, it is not engaged in the business of exchanging convertible virtual currency for currency of legal tender for other persons." This is contrasted with the fact that it can "engage as a business in the exchange" of currency (virtual or real). This is a roundabout way of referring to the inclusion of "currency exchange" as a financial institution at 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2)(J), which makes currency exchanges therefore required to file reports according to 31 C.F.R. 1010.311. "Currency exchange" as an institution can be compared to what a "stock exchange" is. A stock exchange is a business that accepts deposits of both money and stocks and maintains records of what customers hold, updating them according to trades made between customers or with customers of other exchanges. There is a clear interest in protecting the customers of such businesses by requiring them to be licensed because they have custody of customer property. This explains FinCEN's emphasis on trading "for its own account" when describing situations in which the company would not be acting as a money transmitter. There is no evidence that claimant has ever had custody of any property but his own, and thus no evidence that claimant is a currency exchange or therefore a financial institution which would be "required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. § 5313." DATED: February 3, 2017

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⁵ibid., page 4, lines 1-5 of paragraph 1

VERIFICATION I, David Scotese, certify and declare that I have read the foregoing Plaintiff's [PROPOSED] STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and know its contents. I am a party to this action and I make this verification for that reason. I am informed and allege on that ground that the disputes provided above are true and correct. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January , 2017 at Murrieta, California. David Scotese In Pro Per

1	PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAILING
2	I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. I
3	own and operate Mail Center & More. My business address is
4	[redacted].
5	On January, 2017, I served a copy of CLAIMANT DAVID SCOTESE'S
6	RENEWED STATEMENT OF GENUINE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT IN RESPONSE
7	TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and CLAIMANT DAVID
8	SCOTESE'S AFFIDAVIT, on each person or entity named below by
9	enclosing a copy in an envelope addressed as shown below and
10	placing the envelope for collection and mailing on the date and at
11	the place shown below following our ordinary office practices.
12	
13	TO: FRANK D. KORTUM
14	312 NORTH SPRING STREET
15	LOS ANGELES, CALIFNORNIA 90012
16	
17	I am familiar with the practice of this office for collection and
18	processing correspondence for mailing. on the same day that corre-
19	spondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in
20	the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal
21	Service in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
22	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United
23	States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
24	Executed on: January, 2017 at Murrieta, California.
25	
26	
27	Charles Hannum
28	

- 1 -PROOF OF SERVICE